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Abstract 
Previous research was mainly focused on the role of emotions in interpersonal context. The 
current research examined the influence of emotions expressed by a constituency on its 
representative. In this study was found that emotions have influence in a negotiation with a 
constituency. When the constituency expresses disappointed feedback, the representative will 
probably adjust his offer in order to respond to the ‘signal for help’ of the constituency. 
Representatives who receive angry feedback are likely to adjust their offer, but how big the 
adjustment is depends on the need to belong of the representative. Representatives who receive 
happy feedback will probably not adjust their initial offer because of the idea that they are doing 
fine. 
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Their emotional expression, my negotiation behavior 
Negotiating is something we do a lot in our lives. We can negotiate about the price of a bike we 
want to sell or buy, we can negotiate what we will have for dinner tonight or we can negotiate 
where to go on vacation this year. But many negotiations we don’t have a direct influence on. 
For example, what the people in politics decide. We, as citizens of a democratic state, choose our 
parliament which negotiate about the nation’s laws. They negotiate on our behalf, they represent 
us during a negotiation.  
There has been quite a lot of research examining the relation between the representative and their 
constituencies (e.g., Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012; Steinel, Van Kleef, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, 
Homan & Moffitt, 2010; Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand & Ramírez-Martin, 2009; Van Kleef, De 
Dreu & Manstead, 2006), but so far none of these researches examined the effect of the emotions 
of the constituencies on the negotiation behavior of the representative. It is possible that 
emotions play a role in negotiations with a constituency, because the expression of an emotion 
can influence someone else’s behavior (Van Kleef, 2009) and has implications for the outcome 
of the negotiation. Bearing in mind that a constituency influences his representative (Steinel et 
al., 2009), it could be interesting to find out what specifically the influence of the constituencies’ 
emotion on the behavior of the representative is. In this study is examined how different 
emotions influence our negotiation behavior in an intergroup negotiation context.  
First, there will be an introductory part of how representatives behave in negotiations and which 
factors in general influences their behavior. Second, there will be a part where the specific 
influence of emotions on negotiation behavior is highlighted. Previous research which mainly 
focused on the influence of opponent’s emotions in interpersonal negotiation contexts will be 
mentioned. Third, a bridge will be made from the research so far to the possible influence of a 
constituencies’ emotion on a representative’s negotiation behavior. Finally, the hypotheses of 
this study will be drawn at the end of this introduction. 
Representative negotiation 
When two parties don’t agree, they can negotiate to see if there is some common ground to solve 
the conflict. This is easier when discussing with a friend where to go on vacation than discussing 
nation’s laws, where the latter has an impact on a lot more people compared to the former. When 
no interpersonal (i.e. negotiating with your friend) but intergroup (i.e. two factions) are 
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negotiating, groups often use representatives to make the process of negotiations more fluid. 
These representatives will negotiate on behalf of the different parties and try to reach the best 
possible agreement for their own party (De Dreu, 2010a).  
In research it is known that representatives are more likely to become competitive during the 
negotiation than they would be if they would negotiate alone (Mosterd & Rutte, 2000; Benton & 
Druckman, 1974). This phenomenon corresponds to the individual-group discontinuity, which 
says that individuals in groups tend to be more competitive and less cooperative in negotiations 
than individuals negotiating on their own. An explanation for this discontinuity effect is that 
group members try to protect their ingroup against the outgroup (De Dreu, 2010b; Wildschut & 
Insko, 2007; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). They act competitive because 
cooperative behavior to the outgroup can be perceived by their constituency as disloyal behavior.  
Another reason why representatives become more competitive, is the fact that they need to deal 
with the needs of their own group. They are exposed to implicit obligations such as loyalty 
toward their own group and explicit pressures such as accountability. Negotiators thereby often 
believe that their groups prefer an aggressive approach (Van Kleef, Steinel, Knippenberg, Hogg, 
& Svensson, 2007). They want to satisfy and impress their group members which results in a 
more competitive mindset. To impress his group, the representative will make an offer that is 
more favorable for his own group and less favorable for the counterpart. Next to this expectation 
held by representatives, specific intragroup dynamics also directly influence a representative’s 
negotiation behavior. For example, the prevailing group norm indicates a preferred behavior 
(Steinel et al., 2010). Representatives want to impress their group members, which lead them to 
follow the group norm. In other words, the representative adjusts to the group norm. If this group 
norm holds acting in a competitive manner, the representative will probably act competitive. 
This means he claims more for his own group and ask more from his counterpart. If this group 
norm holds acting in a cooperative manner, the representative will probably act cooperative and 
will give in more than a competitive representative. 
Previous research thus shows that in an intergroup context representatives are more likely to act 
competitively. This however does not always yield the best negotiation outcome: competitive 
interactions often lead to lower outcomes than when an interaction is cooperative (De Dreu, 
2010b; Wildschut & Insko, 2007; Wildschut et al., 2003). Apparently, a constituency has a lot of 
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impact on a representative’s negotiation mindset and behavior. It is thus important to further 
specify the role of a constituency.  
In general: The effects of emotions on negotiator’s cognition and behavior  
Besides the group norms held during an intergroup negotiation, emotions also play an important 
role in this kind of negotiations. The way people express an emotion can influence a negotiation 
in both good and bad ways.  They can clarify someone’s preferences (Olekalns & Druckman, 
2014) but can also give the wrong signals. Which emotions people use in a negotiation has both 
influence on their own party and the other party’s behavior.  
Compared to the current research, previous research has mainly focused on the role of emotions 
in interpersonal contexts. For example, Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead (2004) found that 
someone is willing to make larger concessions when their opponent expresses anger. On the 
other hand, someone is more likely to make smaller concessions when their opponent expresses 
happiness. When someone is angry, you may be afraid that the negotiation will end up in an 
impasse. When someone is happy, you think they have lower limits and thus make smaller 
concessions, because the negotiation will probably not end up in an impasse. This is in line with 
the affect-as-information theories of emotion, which states that a negotiator is more willing to 
make larger concessions to an opponent who expresses anger because they think that angry 
negotiators have higher limits (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001).  
With this theory in mind it is likely that the expression of anger by the constituency will have 
influence on the negotiation behavior of the representative in a way that anger will lead the 
representative to make more concessions to the constituency. He will consequently change his 
behavior toward his opponent in line with his constituency’s preferences.  
The information above was about expressing emotions in a negotiation setting and how it 
influences the opponent’s behavior. In the current research, the emotion expressed by the 
constituency is central. How does the emotion of someone of our own group influence our 
behavior? 
Van Kleef (2009) described the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model, which contains 
two mechanisms explaining how people’s behavior is influenced by the emotional reactions of a 
negotiation counterpart.  
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The first mechanism is the inferential process. People can often get information by observing the 
others emotional expression. For example, their feelings, attitudes, relational orientation and 
behavioral intentions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Knowing this information can influence the 
behavior of the observer. For example, when person A is angry at person B, person B might 
realize he did something wrong. Being aware of the fact he did something wrong, he can change 
his behavior for example by doing what the other wants you to do or apologizing. When the 
constituency is in this case person A and the representative is person B, it can be assumed that 
the representative is likely to change his behavior, because he might think that he is doing 
something wrong. On the other side, when someone is the target of an expression of happiness, 
he may conclude that he is doing the right thing (inference) and as a result he won’t change his 
behavior (Van Kleef, 2009).  
The second mechanism is the affective reaction. This mechanism means that an observer can 
create an affective reaction due to the expression of behavior of someone else, which affect the 
observer’s behavior (Van Kleef, 2009). For example, when you made an appointment with a 
friend in the bar and you show up 15 minutes late, your friend got angry. Your affective reaction 
is to get upset because he is angry, and the behavior could be that you will not meet again. This 
mechanism consist of two types: 1. The emotions spread directly from expresser to observer via 
emotional-contagion processes. 2. Emotions expressed may affect impressions and interpersonal 
liking (Van Kleef, 2009).  
Which one of the mechanisms is used, depends on the information processing and the social –
relational factors. The more thorough an observer is processing the information, the stronger the 
predictive power of mechanism 1, the inferential process (Van Kleef, 2009). 
The predictive power of one of the two mechanisms is also influenced by the social-relational 
factors, which contains interpersonal relationships, cultural norms and the focus of the emotion 
(situation or person). In this research these social-relational factors were not taken into account. 
This research was only focused on the emotions and the effects of the emotions on the 
representative. The emotions used in this research will be described in the next part: 
disappointment, happiness and anger.  
Disappointment 
Disappointment is an emotion that can occur when something is happening that is not in line 
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with a persons’ expectancies, goals and/or concerns (Frijda, 1986; Roese & Sherman, 2007; 
Smith, Haynes, Lazarus & Pope, 1993). The expresser of disappointment wants the other party to 
behave in a different way. Expressing disappointment signals a need for help (Clark, Pataki & 
Carver, 1996; Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Van Kleef et al., 2006) and is 
characterized by a lack of coping potential and a low level of arousal (Smith et al., 1993). It can 
be assumed that because of the neediness and this ‘signal for help’ that expressing 
disappointment by the constituency will lead to adaptive behavior by the representative.  
Happiness 
Happiness is a positive emotion. Expressions of happiness can be seen as signals of a secure and 
safe environment (Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield & Campos, 1986; Sorce, Emde, Campos & 
Klinnert, 1985). For example by smiling. It is also a helpful tool for building social relationships 
(Fredrickson, 1998, 2001) and it increases the development of trust and positive intragroup 
relations (Walter & Bruch, 2008). In this experiment, when the constituency expresses 
happiness, it is likely that it gives the representative a safe and secure feeling about how the 
negotiation is working out and thus won’t change his behavior, because he thinks he is doing 
fine.  
Anger 
Anger is, like disappointment, a negative emotion (Van Doorn, Van Kleef & Van der Pligt, 
2015). Also anger is an emotion that occurs when something happens that you don’t want to 
happen, but instead of showing signals of weakness, anger is a way to show power and 
dominance (Tiedens, 2001). In a negotiation setting, showing anger is a way to let the other party 
know you won’t settle for a poor deal, which forces the opposing party to make more 
concessions in order to reach an agreement (Van Kleef, Van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck & Van Beest, 
2008). In an intragroup setting, the expression of anger can create the perception that one’s 
belonging in the group is under threat (Heerding, Van Kleef, Homan & Fisher, 2013). An angry 
constituency will thus probably lead to adaptive behavior of the representative because he 
doesn’t want to feel threatened by the group and thus conform. But little is known about anger 
expressions in cooperative, equal-power situations. Wubben, De Cremer & Van Dijk (2009) 
stated that in an equal-power, cooperative situation a target of the expressed anger is less likely 
to make concessions with the anger expressing party. In other words, anger doesn’t have the 
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same strong effect on equal-powered people in a cooperative setting as in an interpersonal 
negotiation setting. Because in the negotiation setting with a representative the anger is 
expressed (constituency) and targeted (representative) in the same group, expressing anger can 
also not lead to change in behavior because of this power equality in the group. Need to belong 
may be a moderating factor here, a phenomenon I will explain in the next paragraph. 
Need to belong 
Baumeister & Leary (1995) described need to belong as the ‘desire for interpersonal 
attachments’ (p.520). We want to be part of a group and maintain relationships with others. If the 
representative’s need to belong is strong, he is likely to exhibit more group-serving behavior 
(Steinel et al., 2010). De Cremer & Leonardelli (2003) found that people were more focused on 
the collective interest of the group if their need to belong was strong. Knowing this, presumed in 
this research is that the need to belong of the representative has influence on the representative’s 
behavior in an intergroup negotiation, and therefore will serve as a moderator in our research. 
The impact of the need to belong will be in such a way that the higher one’s need to belong, the 
more likely it is that the negotiator will make an adjustment in their opinion towards the group 
opinion. So, the influence of the emotional feedback on the representative will be stronger when 
the person has a high, compared to a low, need to belong.  
Hypotheses 
In this study 3 hypotheses will be examined:  
Hypotheses 1: Expressing disappointment by the constituency will lead the representative to 
adjust his offer.  
Hypotheses 2a: When the constituency expresses anger, the representative will adjust his offer if 
he has a high need to belong. 
Hypotheses 2b: When the constituency expresses anger, the representative will not adjust his 
offer if he has a low need to belong. 
Hypotheses 3: Expressing happiness by the constituency will lead the representative to not adjust 
his offer. 
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Method 
Participants 
The participants that participated in this experiment had a mean age of 21.62 years (SD = 2.82). 
In total, 142 participants (34 men, 87 women, 21 did not report) participated in this experiment 
in exchange for 3 euro or 1 credit. The participants were recruited via SONA, flyers and 
Facebook.  
 
N = 21 participants who did not indicate an offer in the negotiation (i.e., participants with a 
missing value on one of the two core dependent variables; see below) were excluded from the 
analyses.  
Design 
The experimental design has one independent variable (emotion expression of the constituents: 
anger, happiness, disappointment, and a control condition) which is manipulated between 
participants. Participants negotiate as representatives, and their negotiation behavior is the focal 
dependent variable. Need to belong will function as a moderator in this research. 
Material 
This experiment is based on the scenarios of Robertson (2011). His scenario in which 
participants had to imagine they were part of a student union which provided students with 
summaries was used. The need to belong of the participants was measured with the need to 
belong scale of Leary (2013).  
There were an informed consent and a debriefing made for this experiment.  
Qualtrics was used for displaying the experiment on the computers in the lab of the Faculty of 
Social Science in Leiden.  
The negotiation task 
There were two issues where the participant had to negotiate about. In the first issue the 
participant had to negotiate about the price of summaries. As a representative of a group of four 
students who make summaries for certain university courses, the participant had to negotiate 
about the selling price of these summaries. Because the sponsors had withdrawn, the group of 
students had to sell the summaries they used to give away for free to StudentPlus, the distributer 
of these summaries. The costs for making the summaries are 200 euro’s and StudentPlus will not 
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buy the summaries for more than 600 euro’s. The participant negotiated with Jamie, the 
spokesman of StudentPlus. The participant would be given the opportunity to explain his 
negotiation behavior at the end of the negotiation. This to make sure that he wouldn’t just do 
something but really think about his decisions. 
In the second issue the participant had to negotiate about the delivery date of the summaries. The 
group of the representative could deliver the summaries two weeks before the exams, but 
StudentPlus had noticed that the students wanted the summaries earlier. StudentPlus states that 
students don’t want to buy the full books because they are too expensive, but they want to read 
the material for the exam during the course. It will cost a lot of effort and time of the 
representative’s group if they want to deliver the summaries earlier. As a representative it is 
better to keep the delivery time as low as possible. 
Procedure 
This lab experiment was combined with two other small experiments of other researchers so it 
would be easier to recruit participants for this experiment. Participants first read the informed 
consent and when they signed it they were assigned to a cubicle with a computer.  
The participants first did the other experiments before they started with the current. The 
researcher filled in the participation number and after that the participant could start with our 
experiment. First there was a small introduction about the experiment, which said how long the 
experiment would take and that it was about a negotiation. After the introduction came a 
questionnaire about the current mood of the participant, the pretest. When they finished the 
pretest the participant had to fill in the need to belong scale. Till this point, everything was for 
every condition the same. The participant would now be randomly assigned to the experimental 
condition or the control condition.  
The participant got a small introduction about the ‘goal’ of the experiment. They were told that 
the experiment focusses on the difference between negotiating for your own interests versus 
negotiating for the interests of a group. They were told that they would be randomly assigned to 
one of three groups: a participant who would negotiate for his own interests, a participant who 
would represent a group and would negotiate for the interests of this group and receives feedback 
of this group or a participant who would be part of the constituency. Participants were told that 
they were randomly assigned to one of these roles; in fact, however, all participants were 
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assigned to the role of representative negotiator, and the other roles were simulated. They had to 
fill in their name which had not to be their real name, so they would identify more with the 
situation but if they wanted to be anonymous, it was possible by giving another name.  
After the introduction there was an explanation of each role in the negotiation. The 
representative of the selling party was described as the person who is responsible for the final 
offer towards the buying party. The member of the constituency was described as the person who 
could give individual feedback together with the other members of the constituency to the 
representative about the initial offer the representative want to bid. Finally, the buying party was 
described as the person who would start the negotiation by sending the selling party his first 
offer. After receiving the selling party’s offer, the buying party had to decide if he wanted to 
accept the offer or reject the offer of the selling party.  
After the roles were illustrated, the participant got to know which role he had. This was in all 
cases the representative of the selling party. The role description was mentioned together with 
the role, so the participant could read again what his role was exactly.  
The first of two issues where the participant would negotiate about was then displayed. Jamie, 
the simulated person the participant negotiated with, would send an offer (200 euro’s for the 
summaries). Then the participant had the choice to accept or reject Jamie’s offer. If he rejected 
Jamie’s offer, he had the opportunity to write another offer between 200 and 600 euro’s. If he 
accepted Jamie’s offer, he had to fill in Jamie’s offer. They had to wait a minute or so to make it 
more realistic that they had to wait for their constituency to react on the participants offer. The 
researcher gave a signal when the participant could continue the experiment. After the participant 
received the feedback, they could change their initial offer. The received feedback differed, 
dependent on the condition the participant was in. For more details, see Manipulation of the 
constituency’s emotion (p. 15). After sending their final offer, the participant was thanked for his 
offer. 
After the first issue (price) they started immediately with the second issue of the negotiation. The 
participant kept the same role of representative, only this time the negotiation was about the 
delivery time of the summaries.  
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Next, the same order of actions followed as in the negotiation of the first issue. First the 
instructions of how the negotiation will go, then the participant would receive Jamie’s offer (6 
weeks prior to the exam). After receiving Jamie’s offer the participant had the chance to accept 
or reject Jamie’s offer. When the initial offer was send to the constituency, the participant would 
receive feedback after a minute or so from his constituency. The participant could change his 
offer and after the decision was made, the final offer was send to Jamie.  
When the participant finished the experiment, they received 5 or 6 euro’s, dependent on how 
many experiments they attended (one of the three experiments needed fewer participants, so 
when this experiment was cut out after that amount was reached the participants received 5 
instead of 6 euro’s), or 2 credits. The experiment took approximately 25 minutes of the 
participant’s time, but all three experiments together took about 60 minutes.  
Pretest of the emotion statements 
A pretest was conducted prior to this study to determine which emotional reactions fits the 
emotional expression best. There were twenty-eight responses to this pretest. People who 
responded in the pretest could not participate in the study, because they would already know 
what the purpose of the study was. In Table 1 the items with the highest mean of this study are 
displayed. These items are translated. The Dutch items which were used in this pretest can be 
found in Appendix A. In this study these items were used by the constituency to express their 
emotion. 
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Table 1. Emotional expressions of the constituency in different conditions and different 
negotiation issues (translated). 
1st Issue (price) Anger Disappointment Happiness 
Feedback 1 I really don’t like 
your offer, I’m really 
annoyed by it. 
Gosh, what a pity you 
offer. 
Good joooooob. 
Feedback 3 The idea that you’re 
willing to offer this 
makes me kind of 
mad! 
I think it’s a 
disappointed offer. 
I totally agree with 
your offer. 
Feedback 3 I’m really frustrated 
about this offer! 
I really don’t like 
your offer. 
 
Good offer! I’m glad 
you are our 
representative. 
2nd Issue (delivery 
date) 
   
Feedback 1 Pfff… This offer 
makes me mad!! 
I would like to have 
seen otherwise, as 
this offer disappoint 
me. 
Nice! I say go for it! 
Feedback 2 This offer pisses me 
off. 
I find this offer rather 
disappointing. 
Doing well! Keep it 
up! 
Feedback 3 What were you 
thinking, offering 
this?! 
I see your offer as a 
letdown.. 
Fine! This offer 
makes me happy. 
 
Manipulation of the constituency’s emotion 
The independent variable emotion was manipulated in a way that each participant got randomly 
one of the four possible emotional feedback by the constituency (angry, disappointed or happy 
emotional feedback or no feedback). The constituency displayed the same emotion in the first 
negotiation issue and the second negotiation issue. So if a participant received angry feedback 
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when negotiating about the price, he would also have received angry feedback when negotiating 
about the delivery date. All the members of the constituency displayed the same emotion.  
Besides the different emotional feedback the participant could receive, there was also a 
difference with the control condition. Participants in the experimental condition got the small 
introduction about the ‘goal’ of the experiment, where participants in the control condition did 
not see this part in the introduction. The experimental condition was told that they would receive 
feedback from their constituency, but the control condition was not given this information. The 
control condition did not receive any feedback at all. 
Dependent measures 
To measure the mood of the participant prior to this study, a pretest was implemented. 
Participants had to indicate how happy, joyful, sad, disappointed, furious, angry, sorrowful, 
glum, scared, anxious, disgusted and averse they were (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). See 
Appendix B for the full questionnaire. 
The dependent variable was measured on interval scale to see if there was a change between the 
initial offer and the final offer they make. This change in offer indicates the change of 
negotiation behavior. The dependent variable was calculated with a formula: Change in 
negotiation behavior (dependent variable) = initial offer – final offer. The initial offer was the 
offer the participant presented as reaction on Jamie’s offer. So before the feedback was given by 
the constituency. The final offer was the offer the participant presented after receiving feedback. 
Here, the initial offer is the intention of the participant to make a high or low offer, and the final 
offer is the offer which may have been influenced by the feedback of the constituency. 
 
Questionnaires were added to see if the measured constructs could explain the effects that were 
found. The participant had to fill in the questionnaires for narcissism (α = .70, M = 17.79, SD = 
2.80), need for structure (α = .86, M = 45.93, SD = 11.46), power (α = .83, M = 37.63, SD = 
6.79) and need to belong (α = .78, M = 46.76, SD = 8.54). All scales were mirrored (8 – score on 
item) before performing them in the analyses. The recoded items of all four questionnaires are 
displayed in Table 2. In the current study only need to belong was taken into account.  
After the negotiation the manipulation check followed. After the manipulation check came 
questions about age, gender and if the participant had participated in a social experiment before. 
After that, there was a posttest to measure if the expression of an emotion by the constituency 
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had an effect on the participant. Finally there was the opportunity for the participant to explain 
his negotiation behavior. If the participant had any comments on the experiment they could write 
it down and at the end there was a debriefing where we explained what we really did and how we 
did it.  
Table 2. Items recoded by questionnaire. 
Questionnaire  Items recoded 
Narcissism 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16 
Need for structure 2, 10 
Power 2, 4, 6, 7 
Need to belong 1, 3, 7 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
In order to check whether the emotion the constituency expressed was the same as the participant 
interpreted, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. Perceptions of the constituencies’ happiness, 
anger and disappointment were submitted to a one-way ANOVA with constituencies’ emotion 
(happy, angry, disappointment, control) as independent variable. It appeared that participants 
rated anger (M = 6.83, SD = 0.38) higher than happiness (M = 1.09, SD = 0.29) and 
disappointment (M = 5.61, SD = 1.02) in the condition where anger was displayed by the 
constituency, F (3, 138) = 253.14, p < .001. So anger expressed by the constituency was 
interpreted by the participant as angry feedback. In the condition where happiness was displayed, 
happiness (M = 6.76, SD = 0.55) was rated higher than anger (M = 1.26, SD = 0.89) and 
disappointment (M = 1.36, SD = 0.59), F (3, 138) = 237.22, p < .001. Happy feedback by the 
constituency was interpreted as happy feedback by the participant. Disappointment (M = 6.28, 
SD = 1.09) differ significantly from happiness (M = 1.18, SD = 0.46) and anger (M = 5.20, SD = 
1.92) in the condition where the effects of disappointment were measured, F (3, 138) = 102.28, p 
< .001. Also the disappointment feedback was interpreted by the participant as it was meant. 
There were no significant differences between the conditions in the questions measuring the 
mood before the negotiation (all F < 1.73, all p ≥ .16). 
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Data analyses strategy 
In order to check if the hypotheses should be rejected or accepted, independent t-tests were 
conducted with the constituencies’ emotion (happy, angry, disappointment, control) as 
independent variable and change in negotiation behavior (initial offer – final offer) as dependent 
variable.  
Whether a participant adjusted his initial offer depended on the initial proposed offer. For 
example, if the initial offer was already the maximum price the participant could ask, he could 
only adjust his offer downwards or make the same offer. Besides, the interpretation of the 
emotional feedback given by the constituency differ dependent on the initial offer. That’s why a 
median split of initial offer was performed, to distinguish two groups based on their initial offer 
(high or low). The median for the first issue was 500 (euro), the median for the second issue was 
3 (weeks). This means that, for the first issue, 50% of the participants had a lower offer than 500 
euro and the other 50% had an offer higher than 500 euro.  
For the overview, a 4 (constituency’s emotions: anger, happiness, disappointment, control) x 2 
(initial offer: low vs high) ANOVA was conducted. This overview should give insight in the 
ratios between the different tested hypotheses to make them more understandable.  
Disappointment 
To see if the participant adjusted his or her offer after the constituency expressed disappointment 
(Hypotheses 1), an independent t-test was performed between the disappointment condition and 
the control condition. When testing the effect of emotion expressed by the constituency on the 
participants negotiation behavior, a significant difference was found for issue one (price) 
between the participants who were in the disappointment condition (M = 8.79, SD = 86.53) and 
participants who were in the control condition (M = -41.67, SD = 106.74), t(61) = -2.07, p = .04. 
Notice that the control condition showed a more competitive adjustment in offer than the 
disappointment condition. They adjusted their offer in a way that it is less favorable for their 
counterpart. They asked more than the participants in the disappointment condition. 
For the second issue (delivery date) a significant difference was found as well between the 
disappointment condition (M = 0.34, SD = 0.60) and the other conditions (M = 0.00, SD = 0.25), 
t(39.17) = -2.94, p = .005. Notable is the mean of the control condition (0.00), which indicates 
that the control condition didn’t make an adjustment in their offer.  
A 4 (constituency’s emotion: anger, happiness, disappointment, control) x 2 (initial offer: low vs 
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high) ANOVA revealed a different picture. The participants in the control condition with a lower 
initial offer adjusted their offer in a more competitive way (asked more, which is less favorable 
for their counterpart) (M = -73.53, SD = 134.77), where the participants with a higher initial offer 
didn’t adjust their offer (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00). Participants in the disappointment condition 
asked more when their initial offer was low (M = -41.76, SD = 57.28) and asked less when their 
initial offer was high (M = 62.50, SD = 80.62). Participants in the control condition didn’t adjust 
their offer for both high initial offer (M = 0.00, SD = 0.25) and low initial offer (M = 0.00, SD = 
0.00) in the second issue. Participants in the disappointment condition adjusted their initial offer 
in the same way as in the first round; participants with a high initial offer asked less (M = 0.43, 
SD = 0.57) and those with a low initial offer asked more (M = -0.25, SD = 0.50). It can be 
concluded that in both issues the adjustment of the offer differ between participants who received 
disappointed feedback and participant who didn’t receive feedback.  
Anger  
In order to check if participants in the anger condition change their initial offer after receiving 
angry feedback, an independent t-test was performed between the anger condition and the control 
condition. A significant difference in change in negotiation behavior was found between the 
participants in the angry condition (M = 36.91, SD = 88.17) and participants in the control 
condition (M = -41.67, SD = 106.74) in the first issue, t(60) = -3.17, p = .002. A 4 
(constituency’s emotion: anger, happiness, disappointment, control) x 2 (initial offer: low vs 
high) ANOVA was conducted to see if there was a difference in adjusting the initial offer 
between participants with a low initial offer and participants with a high initial offer. No matter 
the initial offer was high or low, the participant in the angry condition asked less in their final 
offer (high initial offer; M = 53.05, SD = 83.83, low initial offer; M = 10.00, SD = 92.22). When 
analyzing the second issue, a difference was found, just as in the first issue, between the angry 
condition (M = 0.23, SD = 0.55) and the control condition (M = 0.00, SD = 0.25), t(42.25) = -
2.20, p = .03. Participants in the angry condition did not adjust their initial offer when their initial 
offer was low (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00) but offered less when their initial offer was high (M = 0.29, 
SD = 0.60). Because the expectancy was that need to belong has influence on the adjustment of 
the initial offer when the constituency expresses anger (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), need to belong 
was included in the analyses. In the first issue, participants in the angry condition with a low 
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need to belong adjusted their offer more (M = 46.79, SD = 71.19) than participants with a high 
need to belong (M = 29.22, SD = 100.78). When including need to belong in the second issue, a 
contrast between the first and second issue was found. A low need to belong in the second issue 
lead to lower adjustment of the initial offer (M = 0.13, SD = 0.62) than a high need to belong (M 
= 0.34, SD = 0.47). It can be concluded that participants in the angry condition adjust their offer. 
However, the role of need to belong isn’t clear because both rounds gave another outcome. 
Happiness 
To test if participants don’t change their initial offer when happiness is expressed by the 
constituency (Hypotheses 3), an ANOVA was performed with the emotion happiness as 
independent variable and change in negotiation behavior as dependent variable.  
Participants in the happiness condition (M = -1.47, SD = 8.56) showed very little change in 
adjustment of their offer. A 4 (constituency’s emotion: anger, happiness, disappointment, 
control) x 2 (initial offer: low vs high) ANOVA was conducted to see if there was a difference in 
adjusting the initial offer between participants with a low initial offer and participants with a 
high initial offer. Participants did not adjust their offer if their initial offer was high (M = 0.00, 
SD = 0.00) but they slightly change their initial offer if this offer was low (M = -3.57, SD = 
13.36). In the second issue, no significant effect was found. After conducting a 4 (constituency’s 
emotion: anger, happiness, disappointment, control) x 2 (initial offer: low vs high) ANOVA 
there was no change in offer found between the initial offer and the final offer in both the low 
initial group and the high initial offer group (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00).   
It can be concluded that when a participant receives happy feedback, he is not likely to change 
his initial offer. 
Overview 
In this overview the results of the hypotheses are visualized in multiple figures. A 4 
(constituency’s emotions: anger, happiness, disappointment, control) x 2 (initial offer: low vs 
high) ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of emotion expressed by the constituency on 
change in negotiation behavior of the participant. For the first issue, a significant effect was 
found for the median split of initial offer, F (1, 93) = 14.84, p < .001. This is an artefact, because 
lower initial offers can be adjusted more upwards and high initial offers can be adjusted more 
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downwards. For the interaction between emotion and median split of initial offer, also a 
significant effect was found, F (2, 93) = 5.19, p = .007. A significant effect for emotion was 
found when the control condition was included (F (3, 121) = 4.40, p = .006), but this condition 
was left out of the ANOVA because the control condition showed particularly competitive 
behavior (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows the difference between high and low initial offer for the four 
conditions in the first issue. Notable is the line for the disappointment condition. This one shows 
the biggest difference between low and high initial offer. Happiness, as expected, showed the 
least change between initial and final offer, no matter the initial offer was low or high.  
 
Figure 1. Difference between high and low initial offer for the four conditions in issue 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The same ANOVA as for the first issue was conducted for the second issue, but no significant 
effects were found in this second issue, no matter the control condition was included or not. In 
Figure 2, the difference between high and low initial offer for the four conditions is displayed.  
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Figure 2. Difference between high and 
low initial offer for the four conditions 
in issue 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The line for the control condition is not visible in the figure, because it had the same mean as the 
happiness condition (M = 0.00). Notable in Figure 2 is the big difference between the initial low 
offer of disappointment and the initial high offer of disappointment. As in Figure 1, this 
difference is the biggest among the emotional conditions.  
 
Need to belong was expected to only affect the anger condition. Although none of the effects in a 
one-way ANOVA were significant, the figures show a trend. In Figure 3, two lines stand out.  
Figure 3: Difference between high and low need to belong for the four conditions in the first 
issue. 
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Again, the control condition, but also the line for the anger condition. This one shows a bigger 
difference between participants with a low need to belong and participants with a high need to 
belong compared to the other emotion conditions. Disappointment and happiness look less 
affected by need to belong. 
In the second issue, displayed in Figure 4, the role of need to belong in the anger condition is 
bigger than in the first issue. Again, happiness shows no difference between high and low need 
to belong participants. Both the control condition and the disappointment condition show a small 
difference, but the anger condition stands out in this figure. 
 
Figure 4: Difference between high and low need to belong for the four conditions in the second 
issue.  
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Discussion 
Disappointment 
The expectation was that disappointment expressed by the constituency would lead the 
representative to adjust his or her offer (Hypotheses 1). Expressing disappointment can be seen 
as a ‘signal for help’ (Clark et al., 1996; Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Van Kleef 
et al., 2006), so the participant was expected to respond to this signal. The participants in the 
disappointment condition showed a more competitive way of adjustment of their initial offer 
when their initial offer was low and a more cooperative way of adjustment of the initial offer 
when their initial offer was high (Figure 1). This can be explained with the limits that were set in 
this study. The participants could not offer less than 200 euro and not more than 600 euro in the 
first issue. Participants with a low initial offer (which means showing cooperative negotiation 
behavior) would be more likely to ask more in their final offer (more competitive) when they 
receive disappointed feedback of their constituency. Participants with a high initial offer would 
therefore be more likely to ask less in their final offer. This pattern was also found in the second 
issue.  
Control condition 
The same pattern as in the disappointment condition was found in the control condition, but in 
the control condition the participants with a high initial offer in the first issue did not adjust their 
initial offer, which probably means they had already offered the highest offer possible so they 
could not adjust it upwards. In the second issue, they did asked more when their initial offer was 
high, so in the second issue the participants in the control condition did not asked the highest 
possible offer as initial offer. Maybe this is because the negotiation issue was different (price vs 
delivery date) and the participant valued money more than time.  
A difference was found between the control condition and the disappointment condition. The 
control condition showed the most competitive behavior of all conditions. This can be explained 
because in the control condition the word ‘feedback’ was left out of the introduction where the 
roles were discussed. They did not receive any feedback, but they were aware of the fact they 
had a constituency. Negotiators often believe that their groups prefer an aggressive approach 
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(Van Kleef, Steinel, Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007), so when they don’t receive any 
feedback they have no reason to suggest that they are doing something wrong. 
Anger 
In the anger condition, the same pattern was found as in the disappointment condition, but in the 
anger condition the participant only showed cooperative negotiation behavior. The participants in 
this condition made less concessions than in the disappointment condition. This can be explained 
by the article of Wubben et al. (2009), who stated that a target of expressed anger (the 
participant) is less likely to make concessions in an equal-power, cooperative situation. Because 
we pretended that the participant formed a group with other participants, they could have felt like 
they were equal-powered. Somehow, participants in the angry condition had the idea that they 
had to be cooperative, because no matter if their initial offer was low, they adjusted it even 
lower. Maybe the idea that it was a cooperative negotiation lead to this negotiation behavior. 
Maybe because the student group and StudentPlus had collaborated before the participant got the 
idea that it was a cooperative negotiation, so cooperative negotiation behavior was desired. This 
pattern was found for the first and the second negotiation issue.  
Need to belong 
Need to belong was expected to only affect the anger condition (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). 
Although the effects weren’t significant, Figure 3 and Figure 4 showed a trend.  In the first issue, 
participants in the anger condition showed less cooperative behavior when their need to belong 
was high and more cooperative behavior when their need to belong was low (Figure 3). This can 
be explained with the median of initial offer. In the first issue, the median was 500 in a range 
from 200 to 600. Participants with a high need to belong will probably adjust their offer in a way 
that their initial offer was not. So if the initial offer was high, they would offer less and vice 
versa. Because half of the participant did an offer between the 500 and 600 euro, they were more 
likely to adjust their offer downwards (more competitive) because they could not go any higher 
than 600 euro. That’s why participants with a higher need to belong adjusted their offer more 
downwards, because if the participant wanted to take the constituency’s feedback into account, 
he probably had to adjust his offer downwards because there was more room for a lower offer 
than for a higher offer. The other emotion conditions showed the same pattern as the angry 
condition only to a lesser extent. The control condition however, shows the strongest effect. 
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Although they did not receive any feedback, participants in the control condition with a high 
need to belong had the most competitive adjustment of all conditions. The believe that their 
group prefer an aggressive approach (Van Kleef, Steinel, Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 
2007) and the absence of emotional feedback leads to more competitive negotiation behavior. 
Participants with a high need to belong were more competitive than participants with a low need 
to belong.  
In the second issue a different pattern can be seen (Figure 4). Again, the anger condition showed 
the biggest difference between low and high need to belong amongst the emotion conditions, but 
in the second issue the participants showed more cooperative negotiation behavior when their 
need to belong was high and less cooperative negotiation behavior when their need to belong 
was low. The median in the second issue was 3, and the range was 2 to 8 weeks, so in the second 
issue it was more likely that participants adjusts their offer upwards (more cooperative). 
Happiness is the only condition that need to belong did not affect in both issues. This is because 
no matter the need to belong was high or low, with happy feedback the participant was not likely 
to adjust his offer at all.  
Happiness 
The expectation was that participants in the happiness condition would not adjust their offer 
when they received happy feedback from their constituency (Hypotheses 3). For both the first 
and the second negotiation issue proof was found for this hypotheses. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, 
both lines for the happiness condition are focused around 0, no matter the initial offer was low or 
high. This means the participants in the happiness condition did not adjust their initial offer, as 
expected. Happiness gives signals of a secure and safe environment (Klinnert et al., 1986; Sorce 
et al., 1985), so the participant got the feeling he was doing fine in the negotiation and thus did 
not have to adjust his offer after receiving happy feedback from his constituency. 
Implications 
The results of this study implicate that emotions matter in negotiations with a constituency and a 
representative. The constituency can use disappointment or anger to make the representative 
negotiate more on behalf of the constituency. The effect of expressing anger depends partly on 
the need to belong of the representative. Expressing disappointment will have the greatest 
influence on the representative. Expressing happiness has the function to let the representative 
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know he is doing fine. As a representative who does not receive feedback from a constituency, 
you will be more likely to show competitive behavior. The importance of a constituency who 
gives (emotional) feedback is indicated with this study, because representatives with a 
constituency that provided the representative with emotional feedback were more cooperative. 
Limitations and directions for future research 
In this study limits were set between where the participant could negotiate. As a result of these 
limits, participants who had a very low initial offer were more likely to adjust their offer upwards 
after receiving feedback because they could not go any lower. To see what the results of 
expressing the emotions used in this study (happiness, anger, disappointment) are, a study 
without limits would be recommended. In a study without limits you will be able to see clearer in 
what direction (cooperative or competitive) the emotion influences the representative. We were 
not able to measure this in a specific way. Also because the group norm was not clear enough. 
Because the feedback did not display signals of a cooperative or competitive constituency, it was 
hard for the representative to find out what the preferences of the constituency was in the 
negotiation (offer lower when the constituency expressed angry feedback or offer higher when 
the constituency expressed angry feedback?). By doing this, the impact of the emotion on the 
negotiation behavior of the representative could be measured. For future research it could be an 
interesting topic, to see what directed emotional feedback (i.e. ‘This offer makes me mad, offer 
less!’) will do with the negotiation behavior of the representative. The current study has to be 
seen as some sort of baseline. Emotions seems to influence the representative in a negotiation 
with a constituency, but it is not exactly clear how.  
Also, some other topics for future research could be recommended. For example, it could be 
interesting to see what happened when the emotional feedback is directed at the person vs 
directed at the situation. In this study the emotional feedback was homogeneous, every member 
of the constituency expressed the same emotion. It could be interesting to see how a constituency 
with heterogeneous emotional feedback influences the representative.  
Conclusion 
In this study was found that emotions have influence in a negotiation with a constituency. When 
the constituency expresses disappointed feedback, the representative will probably adjust his 
offer in order to respond to the ‘signal for help’ of the constituency. Representatives who receive 
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angry feedback are likely to adjust their offer, but how big the adjustment is depends on the need 
to belong of the representative. Representatives who receive happy feedback will probably not 
adjust their initial offer because of the idea that they are doing fine. 
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Appendix A – Emotional feedback expressed by the constituency 
In onderstaande tabel staat alle feedback die door de achterban is geuit per conditie per emotie. 
Achter elke feedback staat de rating die de feedback kreeg. Respondenten moesten op een 
zevenpuntsschaal (1 = helemaal niet en 7 = heel erg) aangeven in welke mate de uitspraak 
onderstaande emoties weergeeft.   
Onderdeel 1 (prijs) Boos Teleurgesteld Blij 
Feedback 1 Ik baal van je bod, ik 
ben er behoorlijk 
geïrriteerd door. 
(5.73) 
Jeetje, wat jammer 
dat je dit biedt.. 
(5.54) 
Lekker 
beeeeeeeeezig! (5.74) 
Feedback 2 Het idee dat je dit 
bod gaat voorleggen, 
maakt me nogal 
boos! (5.71) 
Ik vind het een nogal 
teleurstellend bod. 
(5.78) 
Ik sluit me volledig 
aan bij je bod! (5.74) 
Feedback 3 Ik ben echt enorm 
gefrustreerd door dit 
bod! (5.92) 
Ik vind dit bod nogal 
tegenvallen. (5.44) 
Goed bod! Ik ben blij 
dat jij ons 
vertegenwoordigt. 
(6.19) 
Onderdeel 2 
(levertijd) 
   
Feedback 1 Pfff…. dit bod maakt 
me boos!! (5.69) 
Ik had het graag 
anders gezien, want 
dit bod stelt me 
teleur… (5.50) 
Top! Ik zeg doen. 
(6.19) 
Feedback 2 Dit bod maakt me erg 
pissig. (5.63) 
Ik vind het een nogal 
teleurstellend bod. 
(5.78) 
Goed bezig! Ga zo 
door! (5.81) 
Feedback 3 Hoe haal je het in je 
hoofd dit te bieden?! 
(5.42) 
Ik vind jouw bod een 
afknapper.. (5.85) 
 
Prima! Dit bod maakt 
me helemaal blij 
hoor! (6.04) 
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Appendix B – Pre- and Posttest emotional state 
 
Deze vragenlijst wordt afgenomen voor en na het experiment om de emotional state bij de 
participanten te meten. De participanten kunnen antwoorden op een zeven-punt schaal van 1: 
helemaal niet mee eens tot 7: helemaal mee eens. 
 
1. ‘Ik voel me blij op dit moment’ 
2. ‘Ik voel me vrolijk op dit moment’ 
3. ‘Ik voel me beteuterd op dit moment’ 
4. ‘Ik voel me teleurgesteld op dit moment’ 
5. ‘Ik voel me kwaad op dit moment’ 
6. ‘Ik voel me boos op dit moment’ 
7. ‘Ik voel me treurig op dit moment’ 
8. ‘Ik voel me verdrietig op dit moment’ 
9. ‘Ik ben bang op dit moment’ 
10. ‘Ik voel me angstig op dit moment’ 
11. ‘Ik voel afkeer op dit moment’ 
12. ‘Ik heb het gevoel alsof ik moet walgen op dit moment’ 
 
 
